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I.  LAW, RELIGION, AND THE POST-SECULAR TURN 
Popular debate and much of contemporary legal practice surrounding 
the relationship between law and religion appears to be stuck.  This is not  to 
say that there isn’t creative legal theorizing taking place—indeed there is—
but the framework by which most American citizens understand the 
association of law and religion and the structures by which legal advocacy 
and public policy in the United States operate are largely frozen within a 
zero-sum logic of gains achieved and losses suffered by competing actors in 
the social and political sphere. 
If we understand religion rather conventionally as a distinctive body of 
beliefs, a moral and ritual set of practices, and the organizational structures 
surrounding ideas and ideals of the sacred, what should be the relationship of 
religion to the state?  What are the boundaries of acceptable involvement in 
government activities and public affairs?  What kind of freedoms should be 
guaranteed?  What kind of influence should it have?  In voicing its claims or 
grievances, what kind of voice should religious groups have, and do they 
have an obligation to change the way they speak as they make their claims in 
public? 
 *  Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture; University of Virginia.  This Article is a part of 
Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims 
of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
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The narrative that has underwritten this debate has been the narrative of 
Western secularization—the idea was that traditional religion would 
eventually weaken, decline, and for all practical purposes disappear from 
public relevance.  In the process of weakening, religion technically would be 
free to flourish, but only on the condition that it would be domesticated 
through relative degrees of privatization.  Clearly, the establishment of any 
one religion or any one denomination was prohibited, but all religious 
groups—as a general rule—could hold their beliefs and practice their faith as 
long as they did not make inordinate claims on the common space of public 
life and their practices did not endanger either the life or liberty of any 
citizens.  Within the narrative of secularization—a narrative accepted by 
conservatives and progressives alike—the question has mainly been one of 
degree: should there be less or more?  Should there be a “high wall of 
separation or low wall?”  Should the wall be impermeable or should it be 
porous? 
Progressives have long been concerned about the dangers of religious 
actors imposing their particular beliefs on those who do not believe and for 
using the power of the state to enforce that imposition.  It is against this 
threat that they have advocated a sharply diminished role for religion in 
public affairs.  The law, then, is enjoined to assiduously police, restrict, or 
contain any expressions of religion within their proper bounds.  Freedom is 
at stake. 
Conservatives understand the important historical role of faith in nation-
building and see a direct correlation between the moral decline of society 
and its secularization.  They want to defend a stronger role for religion, if 
not for the goals of social cohesion and restored national greatness, then 
certainly for the formation of children and for the care of the needy.  The 
role of law is to secure and preserve the liberty of religious actors in the 
public sphere.  Here too, freedom is at stake. 
In all of this the shared narrative of secularization is in the background, 
a view that sees the religious and the secular as separate spheres, with law 
serving to expand the influence of one and shrink the influence of the other.  
Each side fears that if you give an inch, the other side will take a mile.  On 
this point, there is, of course, some truth. 
Stepping back we can now see that the background narrative of 
secularization-as-decline has been one of the meta-narratives of the 
Enlightenment.  Like the other meta-narratives of that intellectual 
revolution—the inevitability of progress, the knowability of everything by 
science, the manageability of everything by technology, the continuous 
expansion of freedom—this narrative is in the process of being debunked.  
To be sure, secularization-as-decline has not been entirely a fiction.  The 
social norms of functionally rational, bureaucratic public institutions have 
often been aggressive, giving empirical merit to Max Weber’s nightmare of 
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disenchantment.1  Yet where this has been true, the story of secularization-
as-decline can now be seen as a historically and geographically contingent 
development of Western European and North American societies.  Yet, even 
here, the story was overstated.  In the end, it was not so much the reality of 
secularization as it was the narrative that mattered.  This narrative has 
powerfully shaped the cultural and legal framework of the debate about the 
relationship of law and religion for a very long time, setting the parameters 
of advocacy and the logic by which actors have engaged each other. 
The narrative is finally catching up to the reality.  The debunking of 
secularization as the inevitable decline of religion is part and parcel of what 
is now called the post-secular.  The post-secular, like secularity itself, is a 
pliable concept, but for the purposes of this argument, I define it fairly 
capaciously by the empirically undeniable persistence of religion in the late 
modern world, the recognition of the limits of secular epistemology and 
reason, and the ethical puzzles and political quandaries these developments 
pose.  These historical, cultural, and political developments define the post-
secular moment we presently occupy, and, in my view, it certainly may 
challenge the terms of the debate about the relationship between religion and 
the law and possibly even change the actual mechanisms or practical 
outcomes of the debate. 
II.  POST-SECULARITY AND RELIGION 
To begin, the demystification of the meta-narrative of secularization 
calls into doubt what we have long meant—at least operationally—by 
religion.  If one accepts my earlier, again, rather conventional definition of 
religion, then it would seem that religion no longer describes what an 
increasing number of Americans experience or think of as religion. 
The conditions of the post-secular are found in an intensifying and 
unstable pluralism.  As it applies to religion, this means that the religious is 
constituted by an unpredictable hybridization within which one will find a 
complex blending of conviction, opinions, sensibilities, and habits from a 
wide range of sources, including different religious and philosophical 
traditions, popular culture, secular psychology, and other technologies of the 
self. 
This is empirically evident in the proliferation of spiritualities.  Modern 
conditions of belief have generated, in Charles Taylor’s terms, a spiritual 
 1.  See Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946). 
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“super-nova” that creates, in between exclusive theism and an exclusive self-
sufficient materialism, “a space in which people can wander between and 
around all these options without having to land clearly and definitively in 
any one.”2  In it, one finds “an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual 
options, across the span of the thinkable and perhaps even beyond.”3  Wade 
Clark Roof has described it as “a brilliantly colored kaleidoscope ever taking 
on new configurations of blended hues.”4  Faith in America, he argued, has 
become a broad and eclectic marketplace of faiths and spiritualities that 
includes everyone from religious dogmatists and born-again Christians to 
mainstream believers and from metaphysical seekers to secularists; all are 
distinctive in their lifestyles, family patterns, and moral values.5 
These developments are both accompanied and aided by a weakening of 
the institutional structures of religion.  This is manifested in the loss of status 
of once powerful religious bodies (for example, all of the Mainline and 
Evangelical Protestant denominations and such affiliated organizations as 
the National Council of Churches), a waning of denominational identities, a 
loss of confidence in traditional religious organizations by lay people, 
declining religious authority not least in the capacity to ensure conformity to 
creeds, and a recent growth in anti-clericalism by progressive elites.  Outside 
of their political interests, particular traditions of “religious” faith are 
experiencing enormous pressures of dis-integration and it takes shape in a 
deterioration of its organizational prominence and an enervation of its 
internal and external authority. 
Nowhere is this more true than in the case of American Evangelicalism.  
For non-Evangelicals, Evangelicalism appears to be a powerful religious 
movement.  It seems to have strong continuity with its past and coherence 
within the various organizations that presently constitute the movement.  A 
closer look, however, reveals a movement that is institutionally fragmented 
and theologically conflicted, whose leadership is disaffected, and whose core 
beliefs—held by its laity—prove to be remarkably shallow, confused, and 
contradictory.6 
Post-secularity has also raised questions about secularity itself.  In 
public opinion surveys, for example, those who claim no religious affiliation 
 2.  CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 351 (2007). 
 3.  Id. at 299. 
 4.  WADE CLARK ROOF, SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: BABY BOOMERS AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN RELIGION 4 (2001). 
 5.  Id. at 3. 
 6.  See, e.g., CHRISTIAN SMITH & MELINDA LUNDQUIST DENTON, SOUL-SEARCHING: THE 
RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL LIVES OF AMERICAN TEENAGERS (2005); see also JAMES DAVISON 
HUNTER, EVANGELICALISM: THE COMING GENERATION (1987); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO 
CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE 
MODERN WORLD (2010) [hereinafter HUNTER, CHANGE]. 
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have grown rapidly in number over the last half-century—from two percent 
in 1960 to approximately sixteen percent in 2010.7  To be sure, one can find 
many strident expressions of atheism and a small population (roughly one-
third of the total) that adheres dogmatically to its hostilities.  But, secularism 
in the general population is highly varied and saturated with all of the cross-
fusion of ideas and influences—including those that are religious—noted 
above.  Indeed, its most distinguishing collective feature is not any particular 
belief or non-belief, but rather their avoidance of the institutions of 
organized religion.8  As many have observed, there is not just one secularity, 
but multiple secularities. 
In short, the acids of modernity and late modernity have eroded the 
capacity to believe in the old gods, but they have not diminished the need to 
believe in something.  To paraphrase Chesterton: When a society no longer 
believes in God, its people thereafter no longer believe in nothing.  Rather, 
they become capable of believing in anything.9  And so it is that the forms 
and expressions of sacredness have proliferated in the late modern, post-
secular world, a development that both Weber and Durkheim partially 
anticipated in the early years of the twentieth century.  These changes, again, 
mean that religion looks and feels and behaves quite differently than it has in 
the past. 
What do these historical and cultural developments mean for the law, 
particularly as it bears on its relationship to religion?  I think the answer here 
is a bit more circuitous. 
III.  POST-SECULARITY AND THE LAW 
The power of the secularization narrative has been rooted, in part, in the 
idea that the secular represents “value-neutrality,” “objectivity,” or at least 
an inclusive realm of autonomous rationality as the basis of a truly universal 
ethics.  The foundation for this sensibility has a distinguished philosophical 
pedigree in the ideas of Hume and Kant among others.10  In the law, these 
ideas gained force through various articulations of legal positivism that 
 7.  Frank Newport, In U.S., Increasing Number Have No Religious Identity, GALLUP POL. (May 
21, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/128276/increasing-number-no-religious-identity.aspx.   
 8.  See Michael Hout & Claude Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: 
Politics and Generations, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 165 (2002). 
 9.  See G.K. CHESTERTON, THE INCREDULITY OF FATHER BROWN 71–72 (Waking Lion Press 
2006). 
 10.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). 
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attempted to tease apart law and morality.11  They also gained influence 
through a liberal rationalist tradition in political theory that posited the state 
as a neutral actor or at least fair arbitrator between competing notions of the 
good life, whose normativity was to be more political than metaphysical, by 
which the state would operate in ways that are “independent of controversial 
philosophical and religious doctrines.”12  In this view, the secular (in world 
view, philosophy, legal theory and practice, or the state) is rational, 
universal, cosmopolitan, and tolerant, and it stands in opposition to religion, 
which is non-rational, particularistic, sectarian, narrow-minded, parochial, 
and often-enough bigoted. 
Though legal positivism has been mostly dismantled philosophically, 
and Rawlsian liberalism is being revised where it has not already been 
discredited, the disposition of secularity as neutrality still powerfully 
informs public debate.  One prominent articulation of this is found in 
President Obama’s 2006 autobiography: 
 What our deliberative, pluralistic democracy does demand is that 
the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, 
rather than religion-specific, values.  It requires that their proposals 
must be subject to argument and amenable to reason.  If I am 
opposed to abortion for religious reasons and seek to pass a law 
banning the practice, I cannot simply point to the teachings of my 
church or invoke God’s will and expect that argument to carry the 
day.  If I want others to listen to me, then I have to explain why 
abortion violates some principle that is accessible to people of all 
faiths, including those with no faith at all. 
 . . . [I]n a pluralistic democracy, we have no choice.  Almost by 
definition, faith and reason operate in different domains and involve 
different paths to discerning truth.  Reason—and science—involves 
the accumulation of knowledge based on realities that we can all 
apprehend.  Religion, by contrast, is based on truths that are not 
provable through ordinary human understanding—the “belief in 
things not seen.”13 
Such a view, as I say, remains influential, but the conditions of our late 
modern, post-secular world make it less and less plausible.  From the 
 11.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597 
(1958). 
 12.  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 223 
(1985). 
 13.  BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 219 (2006). 
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vantage point of the sociology of knowledge and even legal philosophy, the 
basic argument against this position would seem to be non-controversial to 
the point of banality.14 
The implication, however, remains highly controversial, at least in 
political theory and legal practice.  The distinction between religion and the 
law as discrete spheres of discourse and activity is overdrawn.  The public 
square may be “naked” of explicitly traditional religious values and symbols, 
but it is by no means naked of normativity.  Indeed, there can be no 
neutrality in the law, and therefore, the state cannot be neutral with regard to 
the public good.  Secularity is its own form of normative particularity, so 
much so that even the possibility of fairness is called into question. 
To the extent that the “secular” passes as neutrality, universality, or 
both, it is only because its particular normativity is concealed within a 
habitus or system of dispositions, tendencies and inclinations within which 
 14.  My own version draws from the sociology of knowledge and begins by recognizing that 
every human society is an enterprise of world-building.  The world, of course, is culture and its 
fundamental purpose is to provide the structures for human life that are lacking in their biological 
nature.  Culture represents an ordering of experience, whereby a meaningful order is imposed upon 
both subjective understanding and collective action.  
  Language is the most basic structure of culture and its use the most basic activity of world-
construction and world-maintenance.  Not only is the world in its particularity named, but through 
syntax and grammar, language provides a structure of relationships among, within, between, and 
around all that constitutes human experience.  It is upon the foundation of language and by means of 
it that the cognitive and normative edifice that passes for human knowledge is built. 
  The power of language is the power to define reality: what is and what is not, what is right 
and what is wrong; what we should embrace and what we should eschew.  In other words, language 
is powerful not just because through it justifications can be generated to explain why things are the 
way they are or why things ought to be different than they are.  Rather, language is powerful because 
it contains its own justifications.  The direction of civilizations and the course of a person’s life both 
hinge on words and phrases and their meanings. 
  Culture is then inherently and ubiquitously normative.  Culture is, by its very nature, all 
about “the good”—it speaks to the nature of the good person, the good life, the good society.  
Normativity, in short, is not one element of culture, but rather characterizes it through and through, 
in no small part because humans are themselves normative through and through.  They are always 
involved in evaluative processes about what is good, sacred, desirable, or admirable, as well as what 
is bad, profane, undesirable, or contemptible. 
  It goes without saying that the law occupies a distinctive place in the world-building 
enterprise.  Law is the language of the state and thus, by its very nature as a language it too defines a 
particular reality—not least, the normative reality of what the state will allow and not allow, what it 
requires and does not require, and the consequences of failing to abide within those strictures.  The 
inherent normativity of the law, of course, goes beyond particular statutes and codes.  It is found in 
the ideals of justice, systems of jurisprudence, theories of legal practice, and historical narratives that 
underwrite it.  In short, law presupposes cosmology that is itself underwritten by implicit epistemic 
and moral authority.  The law performs in regard to that cosmology, but it is a task mainly of 
legitimization and, to a lesser degree, of unconscious interpretation and expression. 
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such things are taken-for-granted.  It is so deeply embedded in this habitus 
that secularity just seems “obvious” and “natural.”  What is natural, though, 
is simply the taken-for-granted that has forgotten its historical origins15—the 
implicit that is inarticulate about its normative commitments.  The neutrality 
or universality, or both, of the secular continues to present itself this way 
because it is sustained through massive plausibility structures (such as the 
state, market, science, and higher education, etc.) for which bureaucratic 
rationality provides the dominant ethos.  Stanley Fish is right to note that 
“[t]he law . . . is continuously engaged in effacing the ideological content of 
its mechanisms so that it can present itself as a ‘discourse which is context 
independent in its claims to universality and reason.’”16 
There are those who see through the pretense of formalism to the ethical 
and, by extension, socio-cultural dilemmas this poses.  As James Miller 
summarized, “there is no Aristotelean mean, no Platonic idea of the good, no 
moral compass implicit in our ability to reason, and no regulative ideal of 
consensus that could help us to smooth away the rough edges of competing 
forms of life and enable us to reconcile their incommensurable claims.”17  
And so why bother even trying?  Michel Foucault takes it further arguing 
that “‘[t]he unity of society’ [‘L’ensemble de la societe’] is precisely that 
which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed.”18 
But even if we concede in the abstract that there can be no universal 
theory of the common good that we will all agree to, nor any way to 
objectively “fix” or “ground” an understanding of a common good, it is 
sociologically naïve to imagine that some socio-political consensus, with 
implicit notions of the common good, will not take shape.  Cultures by their 
nature have hegemonic tendencies and so, by extension, does the state.19  
The institutional pressures at work in all modern societies—in education, 
commerce, crime, defense, foreign policy, and so on—drive them to fashion 
some kind of uneven, if still approximate, working consensus in public life.  
This is no less true in highly pluralistic societies.  Those institutional 
dynamics are at work whether we like it or not, and whether we think it is a 
good thing or not.  Needless to say, normativity infuses the entire process 
and, thus, questions concerning the common good are implicit throughout.  
In all of these areas, the state makes binding decisions affecting the whole of 
society, in the name of society itself.  To formulate law and policy is, as 
 15.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 78 (Richard Nice trans., 1977). 
 16.  STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 
175 (1994) (embellishing a point made in PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN 
LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC, AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 175 (1987)). 
 17.  JAMES MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 8 (1993) (italics removed). 
 18.  James Miller, Foucault’s Politics in Biographical Perspective, 97 SALMAGUNDI 30, 38 
(1993) (brackets and italics in original). 
 19.  See Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 528. 
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Robert Cover famously put it, to create and sustain a particular nomos, a 
normative universe that draws distinctions, discriminates, judges, excludes 
as well as includes—it is, in short, to take sides on the matter of the common 
good.20  The distinction between law and religion as separate spheres of 
discourse, then, is overstated because, by necessity, both are infused with 
normativity; both are inextricably addressing questions of the common good. 
But there is at least one critical difference.  The state’s involvement in 
such questions raises the stakes of the outcome considerably.  As Weber 
observed, the power of the state is finally grounded in its exclusive claims to 
legitimate violence—that is, to exercise coercion on behalf of a particular, 
even if evolving, consensus.21  As a consequence, those who fundamentally 
disagree with the principles contained in law, refuse to submit to them.  
Furthermore, those who disagree work outside of the established channels 
for changing the law and are vulnerable to the exigencies of state-imposed 
violence. 
IV.  LAW AND THE EXPANSION OF PLURALISM 
The dynamics of law and the state, culture and violence come into relief 
in the history of expanding pluralism in America.  Accompanying every 
moment of expansion in the composition of diversity has been a new wave 
of challenge to the existing socio-cultural and legal consensus, and its 
prevailing understanding of America’s collective identity and civic culture.  
Needless to say, this expansion has been anything but linear, gradual, or 
harmonious.  Tension, conflict, and violence ensued as new and rising 
groups have challenged an existing establishment that had excluded them 
from full membership and participation in collective life.  Up until the 
present moment, the power of the state was nearly always manifested in 
resisting, containing, or regulating this expansion through its coercive power 
for the sake of sustaining the existing consensus. 
Consider the role of law and government in the expansion of 
confessional pluralism, differences mainly rooted in different belief 
systems.22  In the colonial period, Catholics were forced to pay taxes in 
support of the Church of England, were denied participation in politics, and 
in certain places, witnessed the outlawing of the mass, the sacraments, and 
 20.  Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983). 
 21.  MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946). 
 22.  See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 76 
(1991) [hereinafter HUNTER, CULTURE WARS]. 
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the founding of Catholic schools.23  As the number of Catholic immigrants 
from Ireland and Germany increased from the 1830s through the 1860s, their 
marginality was reinforced through institutional, physical, and symbolic 
coercion.24  It was not only groups such as the Know-Nothing Society that 
were bent on purging the country of “foreign influence, Popery, Jesuitism, 
and Catholicism,” but it was a sentiment deeply embedded within the 
economic, educational, and status structures of the society.25  The emergence 
of Mormonism also generated a reception that was anything but hospitable.26  
Mormons suffered forced expulsion from their homes and towns, endured 
imprisonment, as well as faced attacks from numerous state and county 
militias in “wars” taking place in Illinois, Missouri, and Utah.27  Needless to 
say, Jewish immigration in the 1880s and 1890s brought about a similar 
reaction.28  Though never as virulent as it was in Europe, anti-Semitism was 
part and parcel of the Jewish experience in America from the beginning.29  In 
the discrimination of Jews in employment, membership in social clubs, 
enrollment in colleges and universities, and property ownership, the state 
was tacitly complicit in their exclusion from full participation in society.30 
Similar dynamics are found in this history of expanding ascriptive 
pluralism—of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality.  Women, of course, 
were denied the right to vote in the United States until 1920 and until then, 
were subject to arrest and imprisonment for protesting the fact.31  Various 
Native American tribes were, from the founding of the Republic through the 
better part of the nineteenth century, forced off of traditionally held territory 
(i.e., the Indian Removal Act32), denied rights to own land, and exterminated 
in acts of war.33  The Japanese were not only incarcerated at internment 
camps for over three years during World War II, but their bank accounts 
 23.  EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A STUDY OF THE 
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 59–60 (1900). 
 24.  JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 414 (1918). 
 25.  U.S. CATHOLIC HISTORICAL SOC’Y, HISTORICAL RECORDS & STUDIES 35 (Thomas F. 
Meehan et al. eds., 1920). 
 26.  See RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, MORMONISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 43 (2008) 
(“Wherever Mormons settled they met specific accusations—collusion with Indians, interference 
with slaves, theft, counterfeiting—but underlying them all was this fear of fanatics in power.”). 
 27.  See generally id. 
 28.  LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA 35 (1995) (“From the end of the Civil 
War until the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States witnessed the emergence of a 
full-fledged anti-Semitic society. . . .  As immigration figures soared, and as a significant Jewish 
presence emerged in the United States, people of every walk of life . . . increasingly focused on the 
alleged deleterious characteristics of Jews that they believed impinged on American lives.”). 
 29.  See id. 
 30.  See id. at 35–43 (describing various forms of anti-Jewish discrimination). 
 31.  See DORIS STEVENS, JAILED FOR FREEDOM 94–96 (1920) (recounting the arrests of several 
suffragists protesting in front of the White House). 
 32.  Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, § 1, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). 
 33.  See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 22–31 (2010). 
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were seized by the Treasury Department, and other property confiscated.  
Clearly, the history of African-American experience is the longest and most 
difficult and painful story of all, beginning with legally-enforced 
enslavement, but including state-enforced discrimination through Jim Crow 
laws and other hidden forms of institutional racism and social prejudice. 
The role of law in reinforcing existing understandings of collective 
identity and consensus (and therefore some conception of the “common 
good”) is also seen in its use in prohibiting the expansion of pluralism from 
the outset.  The Naturalization Law of 1790 limited naturalization to 
immigrants who were “free white person[s]” of “good character.”34  The 
Naturalization Act of 1870 allowed the naturalization of “persons of African 
descent,” but continued to exclude Asians and Native Americans from 
citizenship.35  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 sought to restrict Chinese 
immigration, but also formed the basis for other race-based exclusion 
measures including successful efforts to deny naturalization to South Central 
Asians, Middle Easterners, and East Indians.36  The Expatriation Act of 1907 
declared that an American woman who married a foreign national would 
lose her citizenship.37  And the California Alien Land Law of 1913 
prohibited “aliens [all Asian immigrants] ineligible for citizenship” from 
owning land or property.38  In all of these cases, the law functioned 
conservatively to protect the prevailing consensus along with its implicit 
ideals of the “common good.” 
All of this is well-known.  The obvious point is that tension, conflict, 
and violence are inherent within pluralism and particularly at the points of 
expansion.  Hostility, prejudice, exclusion, and violence are not so much 
debates carried too far, but rather tensions inherent to the contest over social 
space and collective identity.39  The state has never been neutral in this nor, 
by contemporary standards, particularly fair.  It has always taken sides. 
The expansion of difference in a society, then, always generates 
instability that necessitates some kind of resolution.  Eventually, as history 
suggests, some kind of resolution is found in an expanded and more 
inclusive consensus.  Over time, difference tends to be absorbed into new 
 34.  Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
 35.  Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 (1870). 
 36.  Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). 
 37.  Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 253, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). 
 38.  California Alien Land Law of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 113. 
 39.  See James Davison Hunter & David Franz, Religious Pluralism and Civil Society, in A 
NATION OF RELIGIONS: THE POLITICS OF PLURALISM IN MULTIRELIGIOUS AMERICA 256 (Steven 
Prothero ed., 2006). 
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working agreements about the common good.  Again, this is more and less 
true depending on the difference in question—race being perhaps the most 
puzzling and difficult of cases. 
All parties are changed by the encounter.  On the one hand, space 
eventually, even if only grudgingly, opens up and new boundaries of 
acceptable diversity become normalized.  Minorities of whatever kind 
achieve some measure of acceptance within the public imagination and their 
inclusion is eventually reinforced within public institutions, not least the 
state.  On the other hand, the minority itself becomes “assimilable,” not only 
tolerated, but somehow tolerable to others through ways that soften or 
domesticate those features which set the minority apart in the first place.  
Thus, to give one example, both self-imposed privatization and theological 
liberalization were, in their net effect, strategies that diminished the hard, 
jagged differences among various religions.  It is where the differences 
among groups and identities cannot be moderated or domesticated, where 
the expansion of pluralism continues to generate friction and conflict. 
V.  THE CHALLENGE OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PLURALISM 
At the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first 
centuries, we observe the continued expansion of pluralism in America.  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished the national origins 
quota system and opened the doors to another expanding wave of 
confessional and ascriptive pluralism—Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and 
Muslims, from Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.40  Perhaps most 
politically intriguing is the expanding number of Muslims from the Middle 
East, particularly in light of the growing global assertiveness of political 
Islam.  Many in the Muslim community understand the tangled and difficult 
nature of American immigrant history and, with legitimate trepidation, read 
themselves into it. 
Yet arguably, the most important way pluralism expands at present is 
through the proliferation of moral and metaphysical differences.  I call such 
differences moral to highlight the deeply normative nature of the 
disparities—the sharpness of disagreement over what is permitted and what 
is not to be done.  Whether birth control, abortion, or homosexuality, these 
differences manifest themselves behaviorally.  I call such differences 
metaphysical to highlight the way in which these differences are rooted in 
different ontologies—different conceptions of reality itself and the 
epistemologies that underwrite them.  The differences that are moral and 
metaphysical constitute our most pressing dilemmas for they are, on the face 
 40.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). 
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of it, most incommensurable philosophically and, therefore, deeply 
antagonizing socially and politically. 
And so, to take the obvious cases, the debate over abortion is not only a 
debate about the nature of a gestating child, but about the meaning of 
motherhood.  And homosexuality is not only a debate about the nature of 
human intimacy and sexuality, but about the meaning of the family.  Both 
are also debates about the range, extent, and meaning of human freedom.  
Even more, all of these disputes are finally about what the laws of nature and 
the laws of God will and will not permit.  Thus, these debates are 
incommensurable because they are symbolically freighted with questions—
and competing answers—about the moral foundations of goodness and 
truth.41 
The question, then, is can late modern American society absorb 
differences as deep as these?  And if it can, how will they be absorbed?  The 
answer, in my view, is that we don’t yet know. 
Although the origins of these differences and the conflicts they generate 
are outside of the law—in broader movements of the social and cultural 
change—the law is invariably involved as a means of social control in 
adjudicating these challenges.  What is at stake, as always, is the collective 
identity and the limits of tolerable diversity.  In the unstable, fragmented 
pluralism that defines our late modern, post-secular moment, the patronage 
of the state in its power to enforce conformity is the brass ring.  The power 
of law is the power to define the parameters of formal consensus—of what is 
allowed and not allowed, of who is in and who is out. 
The current dilemma was, in some ways, anticipated by the challenge of 
Mormon polygamy in 1874.  George Reynold’s claim to the right to practice 
polygamy was based in the First Amendment—polygamy was allowed and 
even encouraged by his religion.42  Not only did the First Amendment 
guarantee the free exercise of his religious faith, his argument further 
implied a challenge to the state’s endorsement of monogamy.  Because the 
law only allowed monogamy, and monogamy was a tenet of Christianity and 
Judaism, was there not, in the government’s favoring of the Judeo-Christian 
practice of monogamy, a flagrant violation of the Establishment Clause?  
Among other things, the Supreme Court argued that, 
 41.  For a more extensive articulation of this argument, see HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, supra note 
22. 
 42.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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It was never intended or supposed that the [First A]mendment could 
be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of 
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society. . . .  
However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be 
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with 
reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the 
subjects of punitive legislation.43   
“Needless to say, the general consent invoked in this decision reflected 
nothing less than the state’s imprimatur upon the Jewish and Christian (and 
non-Mormon) moral tradition.”44  In the end, Mormons just conformed to 
that general consent. 
But in this case, the problem was only moral in character, not 
metaphysical.  Mormonism, as a faith, operated and continues to operate 
within the extended family of Christian denominations and, therefore, within 
the broad consensus of Christian ontology. 
Over a century later, the culture is quite different.  American public 
culture is decidedly post-Christian, which means, among other things, that 
the state is no longer bound to or legitimated by an implicit or explicit 
Judeo-Christian public culture.  This partly explains why the role of the state 
no longer plays just the conservative role of resisting or containing 
pluralism.  But just as the state is not bound to or legitimated by a Judeo-
Christian ethos, it is also not quite bound to or legitimated by any 
alternative.45  In the present conflict over expanding pluralism, the state 
operates more or less as a free agent whose patronage is intensely sought 
after by all parties. 
How will the new lines of consensus be drawn?  What will be the terms 
of acceptable diversity?  Who is included and who is excluded?  And given 
the pressures of assimilation, what are the legal (not to mention social) 
pressures to adapt to the emerging consensus by those who remain 
minorities to become tolerable to the rest of society? 
 43.  Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1890) (emphasis added); see also Reynolds, 98 U.S. 
at 166–67. 
 44.  See HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, supra note 22, at 309. 
 45.  Although Nolan has made a convincing case that a therapeutic ethos has become the de facto 
alternative.  See JAMES NOLAN, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT 
CENTURY’S END 45 (1998); see also JAMES NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG 
COURT MOVEMENT (2001).  As Nolan makes clear, therapeutic individualism is not exactly a strong 
cultural system. 
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VI.  THE LAW AS A WEAPON 
Because there is no social and ethical consensus on moral and 
metaphysical differences, the law is invoked as a means for imposing a legal 
and political consensus.  In the case of homosexuality, the Defense of 
Marriage Act of 199646 and the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy47 
reinforced traditional boundaries of exclusion, maintaining restrictions on 
the public identity and actions of gay people.  By the same token, new civil 
rights laws have expanded the boundaries of inclusion for gay people, 
providing protections against any kind of discrimination.  By virtue of the 
moral requirements of their faith, the same laws restrict the ability of 
traditional religious organizations from acting in public (most prominently, 
providing important social services such as adoption and foster child 
placement) insofar as those services are funded by government subsidies. 
Similarly, laws legalizing abortion and permitting government funding 
for abortion expand the boundaries of inclusion for those who want or need 
the procedure, but by refusing, for reasons of faith and conscience, to 
provide that service, the same laws restrict the ability of those faiths that 
provide healthcare services. 
The moral and metaphysical differences represented by rival actors may 
not be religious in any conventionally theistic sense, but they are most 
certainly religious in ways that are functional, performative, and 
substantively spiritual.  The conflict is not between those who are religious 
and those who are not, but between those who have competing 
understandings of the good society and the terms by which it is constituted. 
Given the intensity of the disagreements, it is not surprising that this 
conflict envelops the interpretation of the First Amendment religion clauses.  
The ironies here are thick.  It is clearly in the interests of progressives to 
insist on a conventional understanding of religion for it is in traditional 
theism—its beliefs and organizations—that progressive moral and 
metaphysical positions find their greatest opposition.  And though the 
proliferation of spiritualities is a source of what conservatives see as cultural 
decline, it is in their interests to latch onto an expanded, more progressive 
definition of religion for the simple reason that it levels the playing field.  In 
nuce, progressives want a broad definition of religion for free exercise 
purposes but a narrow definition for no-establishment purposes.  
 46.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended 
in 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 47.  See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed 2011). 
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Conservatives tend to favor the opposite: a broad definition of religion for 
establishment purposes and a narrow definition of religion for free exercise 
purposes.48 
Ideals of justice may be invoked and sincerely meant, but no one is 
naïve about the instrumental uses of the law in these disputes.  The culture 
war, not least in its legal instrumentalities, becomes a high stakes negotiation 
over what that consensus in our public culture will ultimately look like. 
VII.  THE NIETZSCHEAN IMPASSE 
There is a larger context within which this drama plays out.  In a world 
in which the social mores—the habits of the heart—of ordinary citizens are 
no longer widely and intuitively shared, but have been thinned out, 
fragmented, or merely neglected; law and the mechanics by which law is 
produced (such as legislative politics, litigation, etc.) fill the void.  Law does 
the work that social mores used to do, and as a consequence, law and policy 
become the predominant framework for understanding collective life and 
addressing its problems.  Instead of the legal and political spheres being seen 
as one part of public life, all of public life tends to be reduced to the legal 
and political realms.  The state becomes the incarnation of the public good: 
the dominant and, for some, the only adequate expression of collective life.  
In this development we come to ascribe impossibly high expectations to 
what the law can accomplish. 
What adds pathos to this larger political culture is the growing influence 
of a political psychology of ressentiment.49  Ressentiment, defined by anger, 
envy, hate, rage, and revenge, becomes the motive for legal and political 
action.50  As I have previously explained: 
 Ressentiment is grounded in a narrative of injury or, at least, 
perceived injury; a strong belief that one has been or is being 
wronged.  The root of this is the sense of entitlement a group holds.  
The entitlement may be to greater respect, greater influence, or 
perhaps a better lot in life and it may draw from the past or the 
present; it may be privilege once enjoyed or the belief that present 
virtue now warrants it.  In the end, these benefits have been 
 48.  One version of this dilemma was put succinctly by a representative from the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops: “It’s true that the church doesn’t have a First Amendment right to 
have a government contract, . . . but it does have a First Amendment right not to be excluded from a 
contract based on its religious beliefs.”  Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit 
Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/us/for-
bishops-a-battle-over-whose-rights-prevail.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Anthony R. Picarello Jr.). 
 49.  See HUNTER, CHANGE, supra note 6, at 11 (developing this specific argument). 
 50.  Id. at 107. 
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withheld or taken away or there is a perceived threat that they will 
be taken away by those now in positions of power. 
 The sense of injury is the key.  Over time, the perceived injustice 
becomes central to the person’s and the group’s identity.  
Understanding themselves to be victimized is not a passive 
acknowledgement but a belief that can be cultivated.  Accounts of 
atrocity become a crucial subplot of the narrative, evidence that 
reinforces the sense that they have been or will be wronged or 
victimized.  Cultivating the fear of further injury becomes a strategy 
for generating solidarity within the group and mobilizing the group 
to action.  It is often useful at such times to exaggerate or magnify 
the threat. . . . 
 In this [cultural] logic, it is only natural that wrongs need to be 
righted.  And so it is, then, that the injury—real or perceived—leads 
the aggrieved to accuse, blame, vilify, and then seek revenge on 
those whom they see as responsible.  The adversary has to be shown 
for who they are, exposed for their corruption, and put in their 
place. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . The tendency now effects conservatives every bit as much as 
it does liberals; those who favor small government as it does those 
who want a larger government[; Christians as much as humanists].  
It has affected everyone’s language, imagination, and expectations, 
not least conservatives who, like others, look to law, policy, and 
political process as the structure and resolution to their concerns and 
grievances; who look to politics as the framework of self-validation 
and self-understanding and ideology as the framework for 
understanding others.51 
VIII.  AND BEYOND 
The fluidity and instability of an expanding pluralism that define the 
conditions of the post-secular turn also present at least two possible 
directions. 
 51.  Id. at 107–08. 
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One direction is toward a hardening of the lines of the present conflict, 
further stripping down democratic life to its crudest forms—a competing 
will to power.  In this, law is less a tool of justice than a weapon to enforce 
compliance to whatever happens to emerge as the reigning consensus.  All of 
our actions may be within the bounds of legitimate democratic participation, 
yet the basic intent and desire is to dominate, control, or rule.  This is the 
trajectory we are presently on.  This is the Nietzschean impasse. 
Another possible direction would be based upon a recognition that the 
power of the state is an unstable and unsustainable foundation for any social 
order; that the tables can be turned quickly depending upon who is in power.  
In this, self-interest alone would compel rival actors to pursue broader and 
deeper agreements toward a broader and deeper justice. 
Such a path would not be found in law, policy, or politics.  Because the 
state is a clumsy instrument and rooted in coercion, it will always fail to 
adequately or directly address the human elements of these problems—the 
elements that make them poignant in the first place.  The law’s role in 
addressing human problems can only be partial and limited.  While law and 
policy do reflect values, they cannot generate values, instill values, or 
amicably settle the conflict over values. 
As the language of the state, the law is finally and invariably about 
power—not only power, but finally about power.  For the law to be about 
more than power, it depends upon a realm that is relatively independent of 
the legal and political spheres.  It depends upon moral criteria, 
institutionalized and practiced in the larger society, that are relatively 
autonomous from the realm of law and politics.  For this to happen, the 
current conflation of the “public” with the “political” would have to be 
disentangled, establishing a greater independence and authority for those 
civic institutions that do generate and enable values—faith, the arts, 
education, family, and philanthropy. 
The law itself may not be able to offer an alternative way through the 
present impasse, but there is a sense in which an alternative will not be 
found without the creative role of the law.  An alternative path will only be 
found if law, policy, and politics create and protect the space where culture, 
in its generative capacities, is free to do its work.  This would certainly entail 
a broader understanding of religion for free exercise purposes, but also a 
broader understanding of religion for no-establishment purposes, and in this, 
a greater sensitivity toward all that oppresses in service to vision of greater 
freedom. 
